DEFENDANTS.' SUPPL. MEMO ADDRESSING RECENTLY PRODUCED EVIDENCE RELATING TO PENDING MOTIONS

INTRODUCTION 1 Defendant / Counterclaimant Democratic Underground LLC and Defendant David Allen 2 (collectively "Democratic Underground" or "Defendants"), respectfully submit this Supplemental 3 Memorandum to bring to the Court's attention key evidence just produced in discovery that is 4 highly relevant to the three currently pending motions. Specifically, on February 28, 2011, 5 Cross-Defendant Stephens Media, LLC produced, belatedly, a copy of 6 <sup>1</sup> See Declaration of Laurence Pulgram 7 ("Pulgram Decl."), Exhibit A never before 8 revealed to any Court in this District, on its face purports to 9 10 provide substantial evidence that: 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Defendants request that the Court consider as a further basis upon which 19 to deny the two Motions to Dismiss filed by Righthaven and Stevens Media, and to grant 20 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of fair use. Given that this material was 21 only recently and belatedly produced, Defendants could not have addressed it in any of the prior 22 briefing. See, e.g., United States v. Maris, 2011 WL 468554, at \*5 n.5 (D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2011) 23 (granting leave to file supplemental materials even after the hearing on a motion for summary 24 judgment); Mitchel v. Holder, 2010 WL 816761, at \*1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2010) (granting 25 26 <sup>1</sup> Stephens Media's responses to Defendants' First Requests For Production of Documents were due on January 18, 2011, ten days before Defendants' Reply in Support of their Cross-Motion. By failing to produce this evidence until 27 February 28, Stephens Media precluded its earlier submission. For its part, Righthaven has still not produced this, or

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any other, document.


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1	leave to file supplemental brief in support of motion for summary judgment addressing newly
2	discovered evidence); Lumsden v. United States, 2010 WL 2232946, at *1 (E.D. N.C. June 3,
3	2010) (granting leave to submit additional newly discovered evidence in support of motion for
4	summary judgment).
5	In particular, Defendants submit that demonstrates a compelling need for
6	the Court to adjudicate the issues raised by the Counterclaim as to
7	, as that issue may affect and dispose of hundreds of cases
8	now improperly pending in this District.
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10	In Symposit of its Mation to Diamics Stanbara Madia assessment of the Court with a gramout of
11	In Support of its Motion to Dismiss, Stephens Media presented the Court with a purported
12	"Copyright Assignment," in the same form Righthaven has repeatedly presented in this District as
13	purportedly creating its right to sue. <i>See</i> Stephens Media's Motion to Dismiss or Strike ("Dkt.
14	38"), Exh. 1. Stephens Media relied on this Copyright Assignment as the sole evidence from
15	which it claimed that: (1) "Righthaven, not Stephens Media, holds the exclusive right to seek
16	legal redress" for infringement (Dkt. 38. at 6); (2) "Stephens Media would be legally barred
17	from [suing]" Democratic Underground, even if it wanted to (id at 7); and (3) there was
18	"absolutely no evidence" to support Defendant's assertion that the assignment was a sham or that
19	Righthaven is acting as Stephens Media's agent. <i>Id</i> .
20	In response, Defendants pointed out that the "Copyright Assignment" did not identify any
	actual rights under the Copyright Act assigned to Righthaven. See Defendants' Memorandum in
21	Opposition to Stephens Media LLC's Motion to Dismiss and Joinder ("Dkt. 46") at 6. Rather
22	the Assignment circularly defined the rights assigned to include "all copyrights requisite to have
23	Righthaven recognized as the copyright owner of the Work for purpose of Righthaven being able
24	to claim ownership." Dkt. 38, Exh. 1. Defendants also noted that, by its terms, the "Copyright
25	Assignment" provided that it was subject to an undefined "right of reversion" to Stephens Media
26	and also referred to unidentified "monetary commitments and commitment to services provided"
27	which had not been disclosed to the Court. See Dkt. 46 at 5-6. Defendants advised the Court that
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MOTIONS

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N	Moreover, also suggests
	that has been requested by Defendants, though not yet produced. Pulgra
Decl., ¶	10.
	- though the precise facts await further document production.
	<u>DISCUSSION</u>
I.	SUBSTANTIATES DEMOCRATIC UNDERGROUND'S TANDING TO SUE STEPHENS MEDIA AS REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
S	tephens Media has argued that it is an improper party because, "[c]omplete ownership
the work	being sued upon has been transferred to Righthaven without any ambiguity" and
because	Righthaven, not Stephens Media, is the only party vested with the right to sue
Stephens	Media's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Strike ("Dkt. 56") at 4, 10.
	eviscerates this argument and exposes the plain falsity of these
assertion	S.

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8	In short, adds substantial additional evidence to the already extensive
9	factual allegations showing a live case and controversy against Stephens Media.
10 11	II. SUBSTANTIATES THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE COUNTERCLAIM'S ALLEGATIONS THAT THE ASSIGNMENT IS INVALID, SHAM, AND UNENFORCEABLE.
12	also further undermines the arguments of both Stephens Media and
13	Righthaven that this Court need not decide the Counterclaim's request for declaration of the
14	invalidity and unenforceability of the assignment. As Defendants have already argued, it is
15	precisely this sort of counterclaim, seeking resolution of the validity of the right assertedly
16	infringed, that the Supreme Court has held must survive a dismissal with prejudice of a claim for
17	infringement. Dkt. 46 at 13-14 (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83
18	(1993)). This newly-produced evidence underscores the importance of addressing that question
19	now.
20	On the question of validity, the Counterdefendants have argued that other rulings on
21	motions to dismiss Righthaven's prior lawsuits supposedly "upheld the validity" of the form
22	"Copyright Assignment." See, e.g., Dkt. 56 at 4-5; and Righthaven's Motion for Voluntary
23	Dismissal ("Dkt. 36") at 20-21. But for each of those rulings (which came on motions to dismiss)
24	Righthaven had withheld from the Court
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27	Defendants also note that  Stephens Media should have
28	been listed in Righthaven's Certificate of Interested Parties. Dkt. 5.

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2	As a result, this is the first case in which any
3	Court will have
4	Rather than dismiss the Counterclaim as "unnecessary," this Court will need to determine
5	whether the settled requirement that "only
6	owners of an exclusive right in a copyright may sue" for infringement. Silvers v. Sony Pictures
7	Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2005). In Silvers, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that an
8	assigned "right to sue for an accrued claim for infringement is not [one of the] exclusive
9	right[s]" in copyright that can provide standing to sue. Such exclusive rights are limited to those
10	specified in Section 106 of the Copyright Act, such as the right to copy, distribute, perform, etc.
11	See id. at 884. Thus, in Silvers, the author of a work made for hire, who subsequently had been
12	granted by her employer (the copyright holder) "all right, title and interest in and to any claims
13	and causes of action against [specified infringers]," had no legal or beneficial interest in the
14	underlying copyright itself, and thus could not initiate suit, because none of the individual
15	exclusive rights under § 106 had been granted to her. See id. at 883. In support of its
16	Counterclaim, Democratic Underground asserts that the same rule applies here.
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21	, makes the Counterclaim all the more important.
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23	may effectively dispose of hundreds of Righthaven cases.
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25	For example, in Righthaven LLC v. Dr. Shezad Malik Law Firm P.C., (D. Nev.) 2:10-cv-0636-RLH-RJJ (cited in
26	RH's motion (Dkt. 36) at 21), Righthaven incorrectly stated that"[i]n the present action, there is no division of copyright ownership as was the case in <i>Silvers</i> ; Righthaven is the owner of both the exclusive rights in and to the
27	Work and the owner of all accrued causes of action." 2:10-cv-0636, Dkt. 11 at 13: 2-3 and Dkt. 13 at 12:24-26. This is incorrect because
28	DEFENDANTS.' SUPPL. MEMO ADDRESSING RECENTLY

## 1 III. SUBSTANTIATES THE OBJECTIVE UNREASONABLENESS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AND THE PROPRIETY OF AN ATTORNEYS' FEE AWARD. 2 Righthaven argued in its Motion that it should be allowed to voluntarily dismiss without 3 paying attorneys' fees because the "objective reasonableness" of its claims had purportedly been 4 validated by the courts' refusal to dismiss its prior claims for lack of standing. Dkt. 36. at 20-22. 5 As just explained, however, those prior rulings resulted from Righthaven's withholding 6 from the Court. With now on record, 7 rendering Righthaven's 8 claim objectively unreasonable. 9 IV. 10 11 further substantiates the impossibility of harm to Righthaven's Finally, 12 market for the work, as relevant to the fourth factor of the fair use analysis. Under 13 14 15 16 17 18 See generally Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for 19 Summary Judgment ("Dkt. 62") at 13-14 (discussing lack of market harm). 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 DEFENDANTS.' SUPPL. MEMO ADDRESSING RECENTLY